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STUDENT NOTES
THE CY PREs DOCTRINE IN WEST VIRGINIA.-The trust doctrine
of cy pres involves the theory that where a general charitable intent
is expressed on the part of a donor to a trust, and either no particu-
lar object is mentioned or the original object is illegal, impossible
or impractical so that it fails completely or does not exhaust the res,
the court will apply the funds to charitable objects cy pres (as near)
to the donor's intent as the law will allow. This method of preserv-
ing charitable trusts by effectuating a trust similar to that envisioned
by the settlor has been given wide favor in many jurisdictions,
but has encountered death-dealing difficulties in this state. It is
universally held that an essential characteristic of a charitable trust
is that the beneficiary of the trust, as distinguished from the object
or purpose, must be indefinite. While the West Virginia court
has exhibited reluctance to enforce trusts which have indefinite
objects, in cases where a definite object is shown the court has
allowed the trust as an ordinary private trust even if the object
so named was a type of charity. The hostility of the West Virginia
court toward trusts which have indefinite beneficiaries was inherited
from early Virginia precedents which are contra to trust law in
nearly all other states and which have been apparently repudiated
in that state.
2
13 Scor, TRUSTS § 399 (1939); 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRuSTEES § 433 (1946);
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 396 (1935).
2 VA. CODE §§ 55-26 to 55-34 (Michie 1950).
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The Supreme Court of the United States, in Trustees of the
Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs,*' announced in an opinion
by Chief Justice Marshall with a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Story that the validity of trusts for charitable purposes depended
upon the English Statute of Charitable Uses.4  The General As-
sembly of Virginia had repealed certain English acts, including
that statute, in 1792, consequently the doctrine of charitable uses
and its offspring cy pres doctrine had been repudiated. The Virginia
Court of Appeals followed that decision in Gallego v. Attorney
General5 and held gifts to needy widows and a bequest for building
a certain church invalid as the beneficiaries were too indefinite.
Further historical research and the publication of additional
early court documents satisfied the Supreme Court in the famous
case of Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs that trustees for indefinite charities
had been appointed by the English Court of Chancery prior to the
passage of the Statute of Charitable Uses. Mr. Justice Story then
reversed his view in the Hart case and wrote the opinion for the
court holding that charitable uses and cy pres are common law
doctrines and the statute only added certain additional methods
for seeking relief.
In 1850 the Supreme Court held the Gallego case had establish-
ed a controlling rule of property, and although that case was
founded upon the erroneous Hart decision, it had determined that
in Virginia there was no common-law doctrine of charitable uses.,
Virginia maintained that position for many years8 before a series
of modern statutes reversed the earlier holding.9
West Virginia followed for a number of years the peculiar rule
of its mother state and held charitable trusts void for want of a
definite cestui.1o Inasmuch as cy pres is accepted or rejected by the
courts according to their favor or disfavor of charitable uses in
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
4 43 ELiz. c. 4 (1601).
3 Leigh 450 (Va. 1819).
64 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
7'Vheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 55 (1850).
s Seaburn's Ex'r v. Seabur, 15 Gratt. 423 (Va. 1859) (trust for building
churches and payment of ministers invalid); Hill's Ex'r v. Bowman, 7 Leigh
757 (Va. 1836) (gift to "any person or persons who may be in distress" void, too
vague).
9 See note 2 supra. See a discussion of the modern charitable use doctrine in
Virginia in 25 VA. L. REv. 109 (1938), expressing doubt as to the present status
of the cy pres doctrine in that state.
10 Knox v. Knox, 9 W. Va. 24 (1876) (devise of land to a church void);
Bible Society v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79 (1873) (bequest of personal property for
religious purposes void). For a purported complete list of cases concerning
charitable uses to the year 1929, see Comment, 35 W. VA. L.Q. 372 n.9 (1929).
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general, there was never a common-law doctrine of cy pres in this
state. While paying lip service to charities being "regarded by
courts of equity with special favor, and given a much more liberal
construction. . ." the court struck down several trusts which
would have been valid at common law.'
2
With the enactment of the present statute in 1931, a limited
cy pres doctrine was introduced for the first time in this state. W.
VA. CODE c. 35, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955), provides:
"Where any ... gift ... be made to trustees for the use of
any university, college, academy, high school, seminary, or
other institution of learning; or for the use of any benevolent,
fraternal, patriotic, literary, temperance, or charitable society,
order, lodge or association, or labor union or similar associa-
tion or brotherhood of craftsmen or employees, or any local
branch thereof, or for the use of any orphan asylum, children's
home, house of refuge, hospital, or home or asylum for the
aged or incurables, or the afflicted in mind or body, or for
the use of any other benevolent or charitable institution, as-
sociation or purpose; or if, without the intervention of trustees,
such ... has been made ...or shall be hereafter made for
any such use or purpose, the same shall be valid and such
land or property ...shall be held for such use or purpose
only."
W. VA. CODE c. 35, art. 2, § 2 (Michie 1955), adds:
"No . . .gift ...made for any of the uses set forth in the
preceding section shall fail or be declared void for insufficient
designation of the beneficiaries in, or the objects of, any trust
annexed to such ...gift ...or for any failure to name or
appoint a trustee for the execution of the trust, but such . ..
shall be valid; and whenever the objects of any trust shall be
defined ... a suit in chancery may be instituted ...for the
appointment or designation of a trustee or trustees to execute
the trust, or for the designation of the beneficiaries in, or
the objects of any such trust or ... for the carrying into effect
as near as may be the intent and purpose of the person creating
such trust. . . "
The Reviser's Note to these sections states their effect is to re-
enact the English Statute of Charitable Uses, "saving practically
every charitable gift from failure." The comprehensive catalog
of different charities in those statutes, when read together, would
seem to validate almost any philanthropic gift, yet in the near-
quarter century since the effective date of those provisions, the
11 Ritter v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 231, 76 S.E. 428, 432 (1912).
12 A gift "to my wife for charitable purposes" was held to be an absolute
gift to the wife, the limitation being mere precatory language, in Baker v. Baker,
53 W. Va. 165, 44 S.E. 174 (1902).
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doctrine of cy pres has not saved one trust before our supreme court.
The first hint of the court's interpretation of the above limited
cy pres statute came in Beatty v. Trust Co., by way of a dictum.
The court said "clearly, the thirty-one act, had it been in effect at
the operative date of the will before us, would have validated it.
.. "I"' The will to which the court had reference gave a fund for
"placing worthy homeless old women in some one of the Protestant
Homes maintained for the purpose ...... That gift is within the
purview of "hospital, or home or asylum for the aged or incurables"
in the language of the statute, and the result would seem inescapable
that the bequest would have been valid had it come after 1931.
The recent case of Goetz v. Old National Bank,'4 dealt with a
will leaving a residue to trustees for distribution to "religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, educational, or fraternal corporations
and associations as they may in their discretion select." Trusts for
charitable, literary, educational and fraternal objects are expressly
protected by the statute set forth above, and religious trusts are
sometimes considered charitable but are validated by separate earlier
statutes. 15 Hence only gifts for scientific institutions remain, from
this will, undealt with by statute, yet the court seized upon that
word "scientific" to invalidate the entire residuary trust. It would
appear the court strained the point in saying "the intention of the
testatrix in the will here considered would not be carried out if the
trustees should use the property bequeathed for purely charitable
purposes and thus ignore scientific corporations or associations,"'10
for the objects stated are clearly in the alternative and no such
preference for science is exhibited.
The court expands on its decision that a bequest to a scientific
institution is not affected by the statute, saying "an analysis of the
two sections above quoted discloses that the application of Code,
35-2-2 rests upon the purposes and uses enumerated in Code, 35-2-1.
The testatrix in the instant case included some of the uses set forth
in Code, 35-2-1, but she named a scientific use or purpose in the
residuary clause which is not named as a use, purpose or object in
Code, 35-2-1."'-, The statutory validation of trusts "for the use of
any other benevolent or charitable institution, association or pur-
13 123 W. Va. 144, 148, 13 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1941).
14 84 S.E2d 759 (W. Va. 1954).
15W. VA. CODE c. 35, art. 1, § 8 (Michie 1955), allows limited devises of
land for religious purposes; id. § 4 concerns gifts and bequests of personal
property to churches.
1 Goetz v. Bank, 84 S.E.2d 759, 769 (W. Va. 1954).
'7 Id. at 770.
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pose" apparently did not, to the court, include gifts to science.
It is submitted that the court has placed an undesirable limita-
tion on gifts in approving trusts only for those chosen fields which
are so fortunate as to be listed by name in the statute. One of the
foremost authorities in the field of trusts, Scott, says "in classifying
the purposes which are held to be charitable, it is possible to
enumerate some of them. . . But no matter how many types of
purposes are thus enumerated, there will always be another class
to include the miscellaneous purposes which cannot be classified
under a single heading. The common element is that the purposes
are of a character sufficiently beneficial to the community to justify
permitting property to be devoted for an indefinite time to their
accomplishment."' ' s Entire new fields of research have grown up
in this country since 1931 which are socially-desirable objects to
receive donations via trusts, yet they are excluded from ever being
beneficiaries because the court refuses to give meaning to the mis-
cellaneous category of objects "other benevolent or charitable insti-
tution, association or purpose." This interpretation of the statute
puts us even further at odds with our sister states rather than bring-
ing our trust law into accord with the great majority of other juris-
dictions as was intended by the legislature. 19
In refusing to allow a scientific object of a charitable trust, the
court said "a scientific, literary, educational or fraternal corporation
may be operated for profit .... We think that a trust for profit as
well as a charitable trust is created by the fourth clause of the
will,"' 20 which is a mixed trust and void. Scott states "not infre-
quently it happens that a testator leaves money in trust to be ap-
plied to such educational institutions as the trustees may select.
Occasionally it has been held that such a trust is not a charitable
trust since the trustees might select educational institutions organiz-
ed for private profit. . . . It would seem that it would have been
more reasonable to hold that the testator intended to afford aid
only to such institutions as were non-proprietary in character, and
therefore charitable."2' 1 The same logical answer would apply to
scientific objects.
Although the vast majority of other states have by common law
is 3 Scorr, TRusTs § 374.
19 See Revisers' Note to W. VA. CODE c. 35, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1955), indi-
cating the statutes of Virginia, Kentucky and Rhode Island were relied on in
drafting these statutes.
20 See note 16 supra.
213 Sco-r, Tausrs § 376.
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or statute overcome the weak arguments against the doctrine'2 2
cy pres, one of the strongest and most favored doctrines in Anglo-
American trust law, has never been used by our supreme court.
Through historical error, limited legislation and unduly narrow
construction of the applicable statute in the Goetz case, no trust has
yet been preserved by our highest court by this, one of the most
beneficent doctrines in equity jurisdiction. Perhaps it can be said
of our court, as of another, that its refusal to allow these trusts
".... has lost to the needy of the state innumerable charities because
the Virginia court preferred to be consistent rather than right."21
That state has undergone a reversal in policy with regard to chari-
ties24 but it remains for further legislative action or more liberalized
judicial interpretation to bring this aspect of West Virgnia trust
law into accord with the weight of authority in this country.
E. W. C.
MINES AND MINERALS-IMPLIED RIGHT TO STRIP MINE COAL.-
The subject of the implied strip mining rights has not received much
attention by the courts, due primarily to the fact that wherever the
right to strip mine is intended, it is usually expressly stated.' The
problem arises, however, where there is a reservation or conveyance
of coal without spelling out the right to mine the coal by strip
mining methods. The question then is whether, under the terms
of the reservation or grant, the coal owner may strip mine the coal.
The issue is especially important when it is subsequently discovered
that all or a substantial part of the coal cannot be removed except
by stripping it.
The problem is important because of the destructive nature
of the strip mining method. By its use, the surface o',erlying the
coal is either completely removed -or destroyed, although it may
22 Any reluctance to accept fully the English view of cy pres is said in a
Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 307 (1939), to be due primarily to: (1) the stigma
and confusion attached to the ancient king's prerogative cy pres, as distinguished
from judicial cy pres; (2) overemphasis placed by the courts upon effectuation
of a donor's intent; (3) desire in some states to limit gifts to charitable corpora-
tions which are under legislative supervision.
2 Note, 17 VA L. REv. 302 (1931).
24 See note 2 supra.
3 If the right is expressly spelled out, it will be allowed unless prohibited by
statute. Tokas v. Arnold Co., 122 W. Va. 613, 11 S.E.2d 759 (1940). That no
West Virginia statute prohibits it, see West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
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